There are 29 automotive firms in the world's largest 500 firms. Yet none of these are "global" firms, defined as having at least 20 per cent of their sales in each of the three regions of the broad "triad" of the E.U., North America and Asia. Indeed 23 of the 29 auto and auto parts firms are home-region based, with an average of 60.6 per cent of their sales as intra-regional. These are representative firms across the 500, as the average intraregional sales for all manufacturing firms is 61.8 per cent. These are a few special cases, especially Toyota and Nissan of firms being active in two regions of the triad.
Introduction
In a previous article in this journal, it has been demonstrated that globalization is a myth, Rugman and Hodgetts (2001) . Business leaders cannot simply assume that world markets are fully integrated and that consumer demand is becoming homogenized. Nor is there a trend towards global economic integration. Instead, the data indicate that world markets are divided into three large "triad" blocks. The great majority of world trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and sales by large firms takes place within these triad blocks, rather than between them. Further, there is evidence that such intra-regional trade, FDI and corporate sales are all increasing. The growth of these regional blocks should not be mistaken for globalization as entry to other regions of the triad is a difficult journey for most firms. Indeed, in another article in this journal, it was shown that only one of the 49 retail firms in the world's 500 largest firms was global (LVMH) whereas most were heavily dependent for sales on their home region, Rugman and Girod (2003) . The world's largest firm, Wal-Mart, has 94 per cent of its sales in North America, while Carrefour has 81.3 per cent in Europe and Itochu has 100 per cent in Asia.
Recently the latter work has been extended to investigate the global or regional activities of the entire set of the world's 500 largest firms. These firms account for 90 per cent of the world's stock of FDI and nearly half the world's trade, Rugman (2000) . From this work it has been demonstrated that the vast majority of international business activity by the 500 firms is conducted on a regional basis, rather than globally, Rugman and Brain (2003) , Rugman and Verbeke (2004) , Rugman (2004) . The large regional "triad" markets of the European Union (EU), the United States (or, more broadly, NAFTA) and Japan (or, more broadly, all of Asia) also account for most of the sales of the world's largest automobile companies. For 380 of the world's 500 largest companies, data on their geographic sales in the "broad" triad regions of Europe, North America and Asia (including Oceania) is available. Of these 380, 180 are manufacturing MNEs, see Table   1 . The motor vehicle and parts industry accounts for 29 of these manufacturing MNEs. Table 1 here In this paper, we focus on the regional sales and localized production of the 29 large auto firms. We develop a table with the regional sales of these 29 firms. We find that none are global, only four are bi-regional, and the vast majority are home-region oriented. We then examine the reasons for such home-region sales including some discussion of the localized production clustering of auto and auto parts makers within each of the regions of the triad. We discuss the possible barriers to global expansion in this sector. Finally, we report in detail on the regional strategies and organizational structures of five leading auto firms. We find that the auto industry is not global, but very regional in its activities.
A Regional Automotive Industry
In previous papers, a revenue-based classification for firms' regional scope was developed, Rugman and Brain (2003) , Rugman and Verbeke (2004) . Global firms were defined as deriving over 20 per cent of their sales from each region of the broad triad, but less than 50 per cent in any one region. Bi-regional firms were defined as deriving over 20 per cent of their sales from two regions of the triad, including their own, but less than 50 per cent in the region in which they are headquartered. Host-region firms are defined as deriving over 50 per cent of their sales from a region other than their own. Homeregion oriented firms, derived over 50 per cent of their sales from the region in which they are headquartered.
If we begin by examining the 'Transnationality Index' (TNI) published in the World Investment Report (UNCTAD) (2003) we find that all but two auto firms (Honda and Volvo) are actually less transnational than the average (59.4 per cent) for the top 100 non-financial transnational corporations (Table 2 ). This widely-cited measure of transnationality is based on comparing the foreign to total (F/T) ratios of three measures: sales, employment and assets. So it focuses on the country-level (F/T) dependence of a firm. Table 2 here If we then examine the regional dependence of these firms we find, as shown in Table 3 , that none of the 29 automotive MNEs in the largest 500 are global; in fact, 23 are classified as "home-region oriented", with a majority of their sales in their home region of the triad. This includes Volvo which, despite its high TNI indicating a lack of home country orientation, is heavily dependent on the European region. Two automakers and two parts makers are bi-regional, with over 20 per cent of their sales in two parts of the triad and less than 50 per cent in any region.
DaimlerChrysler and Honda derive more than 50 per cent of their revenue from a host region and are labeled "host-region oriented." The weighted average of intraregional sales in the automotive sector is 60.6 per cent, just below the manufacturing sector's average of 61.8 per cent. Table 3 here The automotive sector is concentrated in the three triad regions of the United States (North America), Europe and Japan (Asia). In each of these regions, domestic producers are significantly more competitive than foreign producers. In general, the European market is more fragmented than the North American market. In 2002, Renault had 11.3 per cent of the European market for passenger cars and light commercial vehicles. Volkswagen and Opel (a GM subsidiary) followed with 10 per cent and 9 per cent of this market respectively. The five largest European brands, Renault, Volkswagen, Peugeot, Fiat and Citroen, accounted for 43.6 per cent of the European market. Ford, the fourth largest competitor in Europe, had 8.9 per cent of the market. Japanese and South Korean firms accounted for approximately 12.2 per cent and 3.1 per cent respectively.
The Japanese market is the most consolidated of all triad markets. Toyota alone has 38.3 per cent of the automobile market, Henderson (2003) . Honda, the second largest Japanese automaker, accounts for 15.6 per cent. Together, Honda, Toyota, RenaultNissan and Suzuki-Maruti, the four largest Japanese automakers, have 78.4 per cent of the Japanese market. Ford, which acquired domestic Mazda, accounts for 5 per cent.
General Motors, the U.S. leader and the world's largest car manufacturer, has a mere 0.4 per cent of this market. VW, the European leader, has 1.2 per cent. Imports are a mere 4.5 per cent of the Japanese market and include imports by Japanese companies manufacturing abroad.
Excluding Japan, Toyota is the market leader in two of the six largest countries in Asia-Pacific: Malaysia and Thailand. South Korea is dominated by Hyundai, which controls 72.9 per cent of that market. Suzuki-Maruti is the leader in India, with 36.8 per cent market share. Indeed, only Australia and China have Western-based market leaders.
In Australia, GM controls 22 per cent of the market, followed closely by Japan, which holds 20.6 per cent of the market. Including Japan, the top six Asian automakers control 69.5 per cent of the Asian market. This includes Renault-Nissan (8.1 per cent) and FordMazda (4.4 per cent), Japanese companies in which Western firms have a dominant share, Henderson (2003) .
Although the majority of the market in each of the three triad regions is controlled by home-region oriented companies, foreign companies continue to play a major role in each region. For example, Ford holds 10.9 per cent of the European market and is the fourth largest competitor. A number of foreign companies attained a competitive position by acquiring the operations of a local producer, such as GM's Opel subsidiary and others, through organic growth in foreign markets, such as Toyota and Honda in North America.
These findings counter a number of popular myths about the 'archetypal global industry', many dating from the 1980s and early 1990s which saw the global expansion of Japanese firms in the industry. Common views included: that a global car and a global car firm would soon evolve; that all production would shift to cheap labour regions leaving 'hollow corporations' in the United States and Europe, Jonas (1986) , and; that sales by incumbents in the largest markets would be overtaken by more competitive foreign rivals. Both solid research, such as Womack, Jones and Roos (1991) and more sensationalist books, Maynard (2003) supported these views each of which had significant strategic implications for management in the automotive business. We find that such global car industry predictions have not come to pass for the key reason that the industry operates regionally, not globally.
Barriers to Global Expansion in the Automotive Industry
The auto industry operates largely in "clusters" of localized activity within each major triad region, as discussed in Rugman and D'Cruz (2000) . Each region has a particular regulatory and competitive environment in which the major world players compete for market share. Local competitors are more adept at meeting the demands of their regional markets because they possess know-how on consumer preferences, government regulations, and market trends. While foreign companies might hire local personnel, purchase local car manufacturers, and do extensive market research, companies headquartered in that region are more capable of responding to changing circumstances of their primary market.
Cases
We now discuss seven cases with their top 500 ranking in parenthesis:-General Motors Table 4 . Table 4 here General Motors is primarily an automotive company, but it also operates communications services businesses and has a financing and insurance arm. Its automotive business is segmented geographically: GM North America, GM Europe, GM Latin America/Africa/Mid-East, and GM Asia Pacific. Each of these regions has a set of brands it promotes. In North America, for example, these are Chevrolet, Pontiac, Saturn, etc. In Europe, GM's brands include Opel, Vauxhall and Holden, among others. The GM Daewoo and Suzuki brands are marketed throughout Asia-Pacific.
The company is most successful in the North American market, where it holds 28 per cent of the market compared to 8.7 per cent of the European market and 3.4 per cent of the Asia-Pacific market. In North America, GM has a competitive advantage in that it is already well situated in the market and has a loyal consumer base. In other regions, however, it faces competition from local automakers that know their home regions very well. In Europe, Volkswagen, BMW, and DaimlerChrysler build high performance cars.
In Asia, competitors build smaller, more fuel efficient cars that cater to local preferences.
General Motors' primary market is North America, in particular the United States.
It derives most of its revenue and most of its profits from its home-region operations.
GM's strategy must balance the benefit of investing in foreign regions to the benefits of investing in its home-region market. Foreign markets, though potentially profitable, do not offer the consolidated GM company sufficient incentive to switch the focus of its Although the Volkswagen comeback into the U.S. market has been a success, the North American market is still a minor part of the company's operations. In 2002, only 19.9 per cent of total revenues originated in North America. It is the European market that Volkswagen depends on for the vast majority of its revenue. Like GM, which concentrates in the U.S. market, VW's primary market is Europe. Its cars reflect the European taste for performance, safety and durability. Germany accounted for 27.5 per cent of total sales. Including other European countries, the intra-regional sales of VW rise to 69.3 per cent. In addition, Europe accounts for over three-fourths of all assets. This is a highly regional company, and while success in other regions is significant, the company's main strategic market continues to be its home region, see Table 5 . Table 5 were one reason why Toyota historically has been unable to be successful in the European market. European sales accounted for a mere 9.9 per cent of total sales in 1993, but by 2002 Toyota almost doubled the number of units sold so that, in this year, the region accounted for 15 per cent of total sales. This is partly a result of more local production but also of Toyota learning to cater to the European market. Table 7 The Asian economies have been in a slump since the 1990s, and Europe has been growing slowly. This is why the North American market is very important for all Japanese manufacturers. Japanese carmakers began to manufacture in the United States, the largest North American national market, in the 1980s to protect themselves from import restrictions. North America is Toyota's second largest regional market in terms of revenues. It is also highly profitable. In 2002, one-fourth of Toyota's profits originated in this region.
Toyota manufactures locally over two-thirds of the cars it sells in the United
States. The company's Canadian plant also serves this regional market, and a Mexican plant in Tijuana is expected to increase local production when it opens in 2005. Local responsiveness is important. Toyota introduced its luxury models to accommodate the aging and wealthier North American baby boomers in the 1990s. Today, the company is introducing cars to target the young American customer, the demographic echo of the baby boomers. Sixty per cent of U.S. car buyers remain loyal to the brand of their first car. It is thus imperative to service this young market.
American consumers, for their part, have been responsive to the company's reputation for quality and in particular for the lower price at which Toyota's cars are sold.
In fact, during economic downturns in which consumers seek more value for their money Toyota does better in the United States. The company's cars are not only less expensive, but they also consume less gasoline than American cars. The resale value is also higher for Toyota cars. One major advantage for Toyota is that it has some of the best manufacturing facilities in the world, and it combines this with excellent relationships with its suppliers. The company is so efficient that, despite the lower price of its cars, it makes an average profit of $1,000 on each car sold compared to $330 for GM.
Toyota's European operations are money losers, but the company continues to try to access this market and increase its market share from its 3.8 per cent level in 2002. To boost its image for performance in the region, the company recently began to compete in Formula One races. To protect itself from currency risk, Toyota will now produce a higher percentage of its cars within the region. That also means more local procurement.
To this end, Porsche was asked to produce engines for its European models. Porsche already produces transmissions for the company. The company expects to increase its market share to 5 per cent by 2005.
Toyota is one of the most efficient companies at outsourcing production to suppliers with whom it enjoys amicable long-term, sometimes kieretsu-style relationships. If the auto industry is to become more like the electronics industry (as many believe may occur), vehicle brand owners (VBOs), such as Toyota, GM, VW, will be the equivalent of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in the electronics industry, such as Nokia, IBM, and Microsoft, and will concentrate on designing, engineering and marketing vehicles to be sold under their brand while others take care of manufacturing. Toyota is probably furthest along this outsourcing route than other triad automakers.
DaimlerChrysler
When German Daimler-Benz merged with U.S. Chrysler, the aim of the German company was to secure a share in the large U.S. economy-class car market. Synergies (for instance in the area of purchasing), it argued, would reduce costs across all operations. At first glance, one can argue that the merger achieved its goal. In 2002, 58.7 per cent of the company's revenues originated in North America, a trend that has remained relatively stable since 2000, see Table 8 . These data define the firm as host-region oriented. The numbers can be deceiving though; soon after the merger the Chrysler group was plagued by management defections and decreasing profits. while some parts can be shared and suppliers can manufacture different products for both vehicle brands at lower prices, the benefits from the merger were limited by the different product lines of each company.
The second, and perhaps most important barrier to overcome, was the crosscultural differences between the German and U.S. companies. From the beginning, Daimler's management dominated the merged company, which resulted in an outflow of key U.S. personnel from management positions and the designer ranks. The Germans tended to be bureaucratic while U.S. managers made decisions on the spot. Many U.S. managers left unable to deal with the imposed management style. Capable designers went to rivals General Motors and Ford. Over time, the company has improved its cultural management of the U.S. operations, and this is improving the company's overall position in the motor vehicle market.
DaimlerChrysler is undoubtedly a host-region based company, but a closer look at the organization shows, not a cohesive organization with a bi-regional market span, but two internal groups with individual global standings.. The Mercedes Car Group, the noncommercial vehicle successor to the German part of the merger, derives 63 per cent of its revenues from the European market. The Chrysler Group, on the other hand, continues to derive over 90 per cent of its revenues from the North American market.
In terms of production, the Mercedes Group has eight production locations in Europe while the Chrysler Group has none. In the NAFTA region, the Chrysler Group has 38 production locations while the Mercedes Group only has one. This reflects two separate entities each trying to capitalize on their own knowledge of its home region, not a truly bi-regional or host-region oriented company.
Honda
Toyota may be the largest Japanese automaker in the world, but in the United States, Honda competes successfully for market share. In 2002, the Honda Accord was the bestselling passenger car in the United States. Not surprisingly, given the size of the US market, the company generates over half its revenues (55.6 per cent) in North America.
Its home market of Japan accounts for only 23.3 per cent of sales. European sales account for 11.2 per cent of sales while sales to non-triad regions account for the remaining 9.9 per cent. Most of the company's assets are also in its host region of North America, 53 per cent. See Table 9 . Table 9 here This unusual dependence on the North American market is partly the result of Honda's very early market-entry into the United States in the 1950s, as well as Toyota's evolving dominance of the Japanese market. The relative spread of revenues across the triad is not only influenced by the ability of a company to penetrate a foreign market, but also by how much of the domestic market it can attain. A small car manufacturer might have better opportunities for growth, despite the liability of foreignness, in another region of the triad than in its own home region. Indeed, Toyota's share of the U.S. market is higher than Honda's, but the region is significantly more important to Honda's overall revenues than to Toyota's.
Honda's future success is expected to rely on the company's three strategic directions: to create value, "glocalization" a term the company coined to mean localized global operations and a commitment to the future. To increase value, the company relies on continued innovation. Honda's modular production methods are giving it an edge against the competition. Around the world the company is known for its smaller, less expensive, more efficient and environmentally friendly cars.
Glocalization is the company's commitment to a global supply chain that is responsive to local customers. "Made by Global Honda" has already been chosen as the expression that will represent this global supply network that will link facilities in different regions. Honda divides its business into five regional operations: its domestic market of Japan; North America, Latin America, Europe, the Middle East and Africa; and Asia and Oceania. The Japanese market is expected to be served through imports from China, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. To maintain its local responsiveness, the company has R&D facilities in each of the triad markets.
Ford and the Premier Auto Group (PAG)
Before it bought into Mazda and took over the four European auto manufacturers that make up its Premier Brands Group (PAG) Ford had already developed a relatively strong presence in Europe. In contrast to General Motor's mode of internationalization through M&A it had expanded organically through the development of local sales, distribution and manufacturing activities around the world. In Europe it began with a plant in Manchester, England in 1911 before moving to the Dagenham site near London in 1932.
Three-quarters of Ford's overseas production is now located in Europe, with plants in Germany, Spain, the UK and Belgium, Dicken (2003) . Yet, including Brazil around 50 per cent of total production still takes place in the Americas, primarily in the U.S.,
Mexico and Canada.
This distribution reflects the regional sales mix of Ford's core brand, listed in Table 10 On the face of it the overall Ford Group, combining the core brands group and the European-centered PAG, appears to be one of the more global of the largest auto firms. It is, however, still heavily regional and primarily U.S.-oriented. The relative lack of integration between the group companies, particularly when compared to the more recent Renault-Nissan alliance described below, further underlines its regional structure.
Although Volvo, the largest of the four PAG firms, is listed as a 'Center of Excellence for The need to clearly differentiate and segment the individual brands is one major factor underlying the structural separation and cultural distinctiveness of the group companies in Ford. As discussed above, customizing auto designs and marketing campaigns to regional and even national markets is still a central part of the business.
Renault and Nissan
The Renault-Nissan alliance, currently heralded as one of the most successful in the business, represents the combination of two very different organizations, structurally and culturally. Renault is a strongly home-region oriented firm and is heavily dependent on its home economy, France. Alone it is relatively small holding just 4.2 per cent of the global market, but it vies with Volkswagen for European market leadership and held 10.7 of this market in 2002. Nissan is one of the unusual bi-regional auto firms, with strong sales in the United States and a relatively good market position in countries outside the triad regions.
Together Renault and Nissan account for 9.1 per cent of global auto sales, placing them jointly amongst the top 5 companies. Table 11 shows the individual and combined sales of both firms. These are similar-sized firms with very different geographic footprints that complement each other well. Table 11 
Conclusions
The world's automobile sector has no companies producing globally. Instead, most production occurs in sub-regional clusters within the broad triad economies of the EU, North America, and Asia. GM is a very home-region oriented firm, as is VW.
DaimlerChrysler is a host-oriented regional firm. Only Toyota and Honda are "bi-regionals", able to create significant sales presence in the host region United States, as well as in their home-region market of Japan and Asia. There is no evidence of a global car; just regional production as well as intra-regional sales. It's a regional world, not a global one.
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